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This paper examines the impact of a type of employment contract on starting wage and short-term wage growth. I estimate 
the differences in starting wage and wage growth patterns between temporary and permanent workers by using a dataset 
from the Netherlands. The data contain new graduates from post-secondary schools in the Netherlands. As in the continental 
European countries, the use of temporary employment is common in the Netherlands, especially among young workers.  
Those who just graduate from school have less experience in the labor market. It is rather difficult for an employer to find a 
qualified worker. Because of high firing costs for a permanent worker, an employer has to bear more costs if employing an 
under-qualified worker. To avoid this, an employer engages in a more intensive search processes when hiring a worker on a 
permanent worker, which increase search costs. If such costs are passed on to a permanent worker, the starting wage is 
expected to be lower for a permanent worker than a temporary worker. The empirical comparisons of the starting wage 
shows evidence of a lower starting wage, but this is not robust to differences in estimation structure. 
The comparison of the wage growth between the two types of contract shows that wage growth is more suppressed for a 
temporary worker than for a permanent worker. Since the observations are those who have little job experience, training 
upon employment is important. As a matter of fact, almost all relevant observations receive training at the beginning, 
regardless of type of contract. Employers could recoup the costs of training by suppressing the wage growth relative to 
underlying productivity growth. An employer suppresses wage growth more for a temporary worker than a permanent 
worker as the shorter employment period of a temporary worker leaves the employer with less time to recoup the costs. The 
empirical results confirm this hypothesis, and these findings are robust.  
The empirical strategy in this paper takes into consideration the fact that the type of contract is presumably determined 
endogenously even after controlling for observable individual characteristics. The empirical results indeed indicate that this 
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1.  Introduction  
Labor markets in continental European countries are often characterized as rigid compared to U.S. and 
U.K. It is ascribed to strict employment protection legislation in these countries. Legislation makes it 
costly for employers to dismiss employees, for example, by mandating high severance payments. When 
severance payments are high, employers are more reluctant not only to fire their workers, but also to 
hire new workers due to high firing costs in the future. Unemployment rates have been persistently 
high in European countries. In order to relax such rigid labor markets, governments have reformed 
labor market systems. One of the main policy reforms is to east the use of temporary contract of 
employment. The laws allow employers to dismiss a worker on a temporary (fixed-term) basis with 
negligible costs. Since employment protection of workers on a permanent (indefinite) basis remains 
relatively strict, employment on a temporary basis has become widespread in continental European 
countries. An employment contract on a temporary (fixed-term) basis is more common in continental 
European countries, where employment protection for a permanent (regular) contract worker is strict, 
than in United Kingdom and United States. Table 1 shows that an indicator of employment protection, 
which  is  reported  by  OECD,  for  several  European  countries,  and  the  United  States  in  2005.  The 
indicator that  
 
Table 1: Strictness of Protection on Regular Workers and the Shares of Temporary Employment in 







Temporary Employment (%) 
All Workers  Young Workers 
b 
France  2.47  13.26  47.78 
Germany  3.00  13.74  56.88 
Italy  1.77  12.40  36.54 
Netherlands  3.05  15.16  41.27 
Portugal  4.17  19.45  44.78 
Spain  2.46  33.26  65.29 
United Kingdom  1.12  5.54  11.06 
United States  0.17  4.21  8.07 
OECD Countries  2.12  12.22  25.06 
Source:  OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org 
Notes: 
a The OECD indicator of employment protection on regular workers measures the procedures and costs involved in 
dismissing individuals employed on a regular basis. It is scaled from 0 (least restrictive) to 6 (most restrictive). 
 
b Young workers are age of 15 to 24. 
 
scales from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most restrictive) measures strictness of regulation on individual 
dismissal of workers on regular contract. The measure reflects procedural inconveniences and costs of 
dismissals.
1 Table 1 also shows that the shares of temporary employment among all workers and young 
workers under 25 years old in 2005. While the indicator takes high values in continental Europe, the 
values are low in United States and United Kingdom. Indeed, these countries take the lowest and 
second  lowest  v alues  among  OECD  countries,  respectively.  In  general,  the  use  of  temporary 
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employment  contracts  is  more  widespread  in  countries  with  strict  regulation  on  regular  workers. 
Moreover, temporary employment is typically prevalent among young workers. The share of temporary 
employment is higher among young workers than among all workers in all the countries. In Spain and 
Germany, more than a half of young workers are employed as temporary workers. 
In this research, I use a dataset from the Netherland. Thus, I summarize the employment protection 
legislation in the Netherlands briefly. In the Netherlands, when dismissing an employee with a regular 
contract, an employer can choose either (1) termination via a prior permission from the administrative 
authority, or (2) judicial rescission of the contract. In the procedure (1), once the permit is obtained, the 
employer should notice the employee prior to the statutory minimum notice period, which depends on 
the tenure of the employee. In this procedure, there is no statutory severance payment. On the other 
hand, in the procedure (2), the court decision is effective immediately, but the court may determine 
severance pay, based on the tenure and the age of the worker: for example, one month’s wages per year 
of tenure for a worker under 40 years old. Even though the procedure (1) is financially less onerous, it 
is administratively burdensome and it takes longer than the procedure (2). As for a temporary contract, 
there is no restriction on reasons of the use of the contract. A maximum number of successive contracts 
is three, and a maximum duration of successive contract is three years. A fourth renewal or a renewal 
after  a  period  of  three  years  will  automatically  be  a  regular  contract.
2  As  Table  1  shows,  the 
employment on a temporary contract is widespread among the youth in the Netherlands like other 
European countries. The dataset in this paper particularly contains those belonging to this group. This 
paper examines the impact of a type of employment contract on start ing wage and short-term wage 
growth of new graduates from post-secondary school in order to reveal employers’ hiring practices and 
wage  setting.  I  will  estimate  the  differences  in  starting  wages  and  wage  growth  patterns  between 
temporary and permanent workers. In the following section, I summarize the literature relevant to this 
study. In Section 3, I state the hypotheses that are examined empirically in this paper, and the empirical 
model is outlined in Section 4. After describing the data used in Section 5, I discuss the results in 
Section 6. Then, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Related Literature 
A  temporary  contract  employment  has  attracted  attention  of  researchers  as  well  as  policy-makers. 
Research topics range over several aspects of temporary contracts, and empirical evidence is available 
for several European countries. For example, the June 2002 issue of the  Economic Journal is the 
symposium on temporary work. Blanchard and Landier (2002) examine the effect on job turnover with 
the evidence from France, Dolado et al. (2002) discuss the high persistence of temporary contract over 
periods in Spain, where the use of temporary contracts is remarkably frequent,  and Holmlund and 
Storrie  (2002)  examine  the  cyclical  behavior  of  temporary  employment  in  Sweden.  These  papers 
discuss  temporary  work  mainly  from  macroeconomic  perspectives.  Booth  et  al.  (2002)  focus  on 
microeconomic aspects of temporary contracts. Their empirical evidence for the British data shows 
temporary workers are paid less and have lower levels of job satisfaction. In the empirical literature of 
labor adjustment costs, there are several findings of the differences in the costs to adjust workers with 
permanent contracts than those with temporary contracts. For example, using a dataset from France, 
Goux et al. (2001) find that it is much less costly to adjust temporary workers than permanent workers. 
It is also found that firing permanent workers is much more costly than hiring them.  Abowd and 
Kramarz (2003) also use French data, which have direct measures of costs associated with hiring/firing 
employees,  and  find  that  compared  with  firing  costs,  hiring  costs  are  lower,  and  hiring  costs  of 
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temporary workers are effectively zero. Similar evidence is found by Abowd and Michaud (2010) with 
an updated dataset. The finding of higher firing costs of permanent workers    
are consistent with strict employment protection regulation in France. It is typical to discuss such 
results in connection with stringent employment protection in the literature of labor adjustment. On the 
other hand, there are relatively few discussions on the difference in hiring costs.  
The purpose of this paper is, in particular, to reveal how hiring costs differ according to the type of 
contract. However, the data used in this paper do not contain direct information about hiring costs. 
Furthermore, the unit of observation in the data is an individual worker rather than a firm. Therefore, 
my attempt in this paper is to infer the difference in hiring costs by analyzing starting wage and wage 
growth.  
As for the wage comparison between temporary and permanent workers, there are several empirical 
investigations. Some of them use an empirical approach similar to the one used in this paper, which 
will be discussed later. The general finding is that a permanent worker earns more than a temporary 
worker.  Hagen  (2002)  finds  that  a  wage  differential  is  between  6%  and  10%  if  selection  is  on 
observables, and it jumps to more than 20% once self-selection on both observable and unobservables, 
using the data from Germany. Brown and Sessions (2003) find that an hourly wage of a permanent 
worker is higher than that of a temporary worker by more than 10%. The most of this difference is 
attributed to the differences in the returns on individual characteristics. In contrast, Davia and Hernanz 
(2004)  use  two  datasets  from  Spain  and  find  that  wage  differences  can  be  explained  mostly  by 
differences in the distribution of job and personal characteristics between the two types of contract. Elia 
(2010) discusses the effect of policy easing on the use of temporary contracts in Italy and finds that a 
wage differential has widened.  
As for a wage growth, Booth et al. (2002) find that having experience of temporary jobs leads to slower 
wage  growth  for  men,  but  women  with  such  experience  would  catch  up  with  those  who  have 
permanent jobs since the start of career in Britain. Using a panel dataset from Spain, Amuedo-Dorantes 
and  Serrano-Padial  (2007)  find  that  whereas  wage  growth  of  permanent  workers  occurs  through 
switching jobs, temporary workers experience wage growth on-the-job as well as switching jobs. Wage 
growth on-the-job may be due to the conversion of a temporary contract into a permanent one. Those 
who stay on the same job are those who pass a probationary and sorting process (Loh, 1994), and thus 
have higher ability. Boockmann and Hagen (2008) show evidence that the period of employment on a 
temporary contract works as sorting process in Germany.      
These empirical studies pay more attention to the  effect of a  temporary contract on wage growth 
through career in labor markets. Moreover, the wage that is compared to estimate a wage differential is 
not at a specific time point of employment, which may be mainly because of the data structure. As 
opposed  to  this  practice  of  the  existing  empirical  literature,  the  data in  this  research  enable us  to 
examine starting wages specifically, instead of wages at any arbitrary point of employment. In addition, 
the data structure makes it possible to analyze wage growth within contract. Again, the goal of this 
paper is to reveal how hiring costs of a new employee differ according to the type of contract.  
 
3. The Hypotheses  
The sources of hiring costs can be divided into two components: search costs and training costs. Search 
costs  arise  before  making  a  contract  of  employment.  They  include  the  costs  of  advertising  job 
openings, processing applications, and interviewing applicants. They can also include the opportunity 
costs from keeping positions vacant while searching. By its nature, it can be said that search costs are 
ex ante costs. On the other hand, training costs are ex post. At the beginning of employment, a new 
employee may not be as productive as required for a position because he or she is not familiar with the 
new work environment or because he or she does not have enough job experience. Therefore, a new 5 
 
worker needs to have an orientation and training at the time of employment. The training activities are 
costly to firms. Oi (1962) develops the idea of labor as quasi-fixed factor of production due to these 
hiring costs. Although Oi (1962) discusses training activities mainly and assumes that only training can 
increase a worker’s productivity, search activity is also associated with productivity of a worker in that 
chances of hiring a more productive worker. Search activities and training activities are closely related. 
Barron et al. (1997) develop a model of employer search strategy, where information is endogenously 
acquired. Their empirical work finds that employers search more intensively and extensively when 
filling positions that require greater skills in order to hire qualified workers. However, in this paper, I 
deal with search costs and training costs separately. 
Search activities in hiring are more important in the labor market where it is costly to fire employees 
like  those  in  the  continental  European  countries.  Due  to  strict  employment  protection,  employers 
cannot easily dismiss a worker on a permanent contract even if he or she proves to be under-qualified. 
To  avoid  the  costs of  the  mismatch (either high  firing  costs or  the  costs  from  keeping  an under-
qualified worker), employers are careful in hiring an employee on a permanent basis, and they engage 
in search activities more intensively. More intensive search activities are more costly for employers, 
that is, higher search costs. On the other hand, the costs of the mismatch are less in hiring an employee 
on  a  temporary  basis.  When  a  contract  terminates  as  it  is  stipulated  in  advance,  employers  incur 
essentially no cost to make an employee leave a job. Thus, they search for a worker on a temporary 
worker,  and  their  search  costs  are  less  compared  with  hiring  a  permanent  worker.  The  implied 
hypothesis  that  I  will  test  with  the  data  is  that  due  to  higher  search  costs,  a  starting  wage  for  a 
permanent worker is lower than that for a temporary worker, assuming that an employer passes the 
costs on to a worker to some extent.
3  
However, there is a competing hypothesis.  Search activities can be considered as investment by an 
employer. Through more intensive search process, an employer find s a more productive worker.  To 
keep this productive worker that can be seen as the outcome of investment from being enticed by 
another employer, an employer would offer him or her a higher starting wage than he or she would be 
offered by another employer. For a temporary worker, an employer does not search intensively, that is, 
investment is small. An employer does not have incentive to p rotect investment by offering a higher 
wage. It leads to a higher starting wage for a permanent worker than a temporary worker.  
When thinking of training and its costs, it has been a common practice in economics to distinguish 
between general and specific training since the seminal work of Becker  (1964). The standard theory 
states that an employer has no incentive to finance general training since it cannot reap the returns to 
training. They have to increase the wage paid to a worker as much as training enhances productivity of 
a worker. Otherwise, a worker move s  to  another employer  who offers  a wage equal to increased 
productivity. If training is specific, an employer and an employee would share the costs of training and 
the benefits from it. By its definition, specific training increase productivity  only within a particular 
job, and thus, an employer does not have to increase wage b y competing with other employers. Even 
though this distinction is of theoretical use, it is  usually difficult to distinguish in empirical studies 
unless  there  is  a  very  detailed  dataset .  Furthermore,  as  Acemoglu  and  Pischke  (1999)  discuss, 
employers can pay for general training if a  labor market is frictional to switch jobs.  Imperfect labor 
market compress the structure of wage in that productivity of a worker  is different from the wage paid 
to the worker so that an employer can reap the returns to training even if it is general.  
                                                            
3 The extent to which an employer passes the costs onto a worker may depend on bargaining between an employer and an 
employee. If a permanent worker has stronger bargaining power than a temporary worker, a prediction may be reversed so 
that a temporary faces a lower starting wage. Even though it is interesting to incorporate this point in developing a formal 
model in future, I simply assume that both types of workers have the same bargaining power in this paper.    6 
 
Regardless of whether training is general or specific, an employer can finance training if it is possible 
to recoup the costs of training by suppressing wage growth relative to productivity growth. In this 
paper, I assume that an employer incurs direct costs of training at first. My interest is how wage growth 
patterns differ between a permanent worker and a temporary worker after having training.  
However, it may be natural to suspect that a temporary worker is less likely to receive training. Indeed, 
there are empirical findings that a temporary worker has a lower probability of receiving firm-provided 
training (Arulampalam and Booth (1998) and Booth et al. (2002) for Britain, and Albert et al. (2005) 
for Spain).  It may be true at a later period of employment. However, training discussed in this paper is 
particularly the one  at the beginning of employment.  Training is  considered as one part of hiring 
process as in the discussion by Oi (1962). As a matter of fact, almost all of relevant observations (more 
than  99%)  in  the  dataset,  which  is  described  below,  receive  training  upon  becoming  employed, 
regardless of which type of contract. Since the observations are new graduates who have little, if any, 
job experience, this initial training is important.  
The hypothesis to be tested is as follows. Provided that an employer bears the costs of training initially, 
the wage growth would be suppressed in order for an employer to compensate the costs. Since an 
employment period is shorter for a temporary worker, and therefore since the post-training period to 
recoup  the  costs  is  shorter,  wage  growth  for  a  temporary  worker  is  more  suppressed  than  for  a 
permanent worker. Summarizing the hypotheses to be tested empirically in short, a starting wage would 
be lower for a permanent worker than a temporary worker if higher search costs are passed on to, or it 
would be higher if an employer protects investment. Wage growth is more suppressed for a temporary 
worker than a permanent worker. The next section outlines the empirical strategy developed to test 
these hypotheses. 
 
4. The Empirical Model 
As discussed in the previous section, starting wages and wage growth are the variables of interest in 
this  paper.  Particularly,  the  empirical  purpose  is  to  compare  these  outcomes  between  permanent 
workers  and  temporary  workers.  However,  the  type  of  contract  is  presumably  determined 
endogenously. Even after controlling for observable characteristics of each worker, there will be a 
correlation outcomes and a contract type due to characteristics such as ability and preference, which are 
unobservable by empirical researchers.  This selectivity issue needs to be considered in estimation. 
Otherwise, an estimation result will be biased. To take this issue into account, I adopt the methodology 
that  accounts  for  the  selection  on  both  observable  and  unobservable  characteristics:  a  switching 
regression model (Heckman, 1978). 
Specifically, the empirical model in this paper is as follows. For the analyses of both starting wage and 
wage growth, the model comprises a selection equation: for each observation  , 
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The value of    indicates the selection of the type of contract: if it takes a value of 0, an observation   
has  a  temporary  contract,  and  permanent  contract  if  1.  The  variable    
   is  the  latent  variable  that 
determines the type of contract.  It takes the form,   
      
       , where    is the vector of explanatory 
variables affecting the choice of contract type.    is an unobservable disturbance term. For notational 
simplicity, I drop the subscript   for each observation from now on. For each type of contract, a starting 
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where  the  subscript  is  the  indicator  of  the  type  of  contract  corresponding  to  the  outcome  of  the 
selection equation. The regressor vector   contains individual and job characteristics that affect the 
starting wage such as gender, size of firm, and industry of firm.    and     are unobservable disturbance 
terms.  If  the  error  disturbance  term  in  the  selection  equation,   ,  is  uncorrelated  with  the  error 
disturbance terms from the wage equations,    and   , self-selection is not an issue. These correlations 
can be tested when the model is estimated. Since each observation has only either type of contract,    
and    are not observable at the same time for each observation. Therefore, the correlation between    
and    cannot be estimated in general.      
Similarly,  a  wage  growth  equation  is  formulized  for  each  type  of  contract.  However,  there  is  an 
additional complication for the wage growth equation. Since the observations are basically those who 
just started working, a large proportion of observations experience no wage growth. Moreover, for 
some workers, wages have declined since the start of the current job. These observations lead to the 
following Tobit-type model: 
 
       
   
 
 
    
      
  
       
      
                      
      
              
  
,   (3) 
 
where the subscript   again indicates the type of contract:        .    
  is a latent variable, which is 
specified by the linear form:    
      
        , where    is a disturbance term. As in the case of the 
starting wage equations, If there is the correlation between   and the error from the wage growth 
equations,   , the selectivity should be taken care of. In addition to the individual characteristics in the 
vector   in the equation (2), the vector    contains job length of current job measured in months, and 
its square. A positive wage growth is observed only when the latent variable    
  exceeds the threshold 
parameter   , where it takes a positive value. When    
  are less than zero, it is observed as it is. When 
   
  is in between zero and   , a wage for the observation does not grow.   
Under the assumption that the error disturbance terms in the equations (1), (2), and (3), are jointly 
normally distributed, the full model is consistently estimated by maximum likelihood.
4 This empirical 
approach requires exclusion restrictions (even though it is not a necessary condition for consistency). 
That is, at least one variable that enters into   , but not   and    is required. In this research, such 
variables are the dummy variables indicating whether an individual has a baby and whether he or she 
lives with his or her parents. I assume that these variables affect the choice of contract directly, but 
these variables have an indirect effect on a starting wage and wage growth only through the choice of 
contract. When a worker has a child, he or she tends to choose a permanent contract job to secure 
employment status. Conversely, a worker can have flexibility at early job career under parents’ support. 
Other variables included in   and    are listed with descriptive statistics in the next section, where the 
data used in this paper are described. For the comparison of starting wages between types of contract, I 
will estimate the average treatment effect (ATE). In the context of this paper, a treatment means being 
employed on a permanent contract. ATE measures the expected gain from a permanent contract for a 
randomly chosen individual worker. With the framework of the empirical model in this paper, ATE can 
be estimated as: 
                                                            
4The detail of the estimation, that is, the likelihood function, is available upon request.  8 
 
   
                              ,    (4) 
  
where    and     are the coefficient vectors to be estimated in the equation (2) (Heckman et al. 2003). 
It is evaluated at the mean of   over the sample. If higher search costs for a permanent worker are 
passed on to the worker’s starting wage, the starting wage will, on average, be lower for a permanent 
worker relative to a temporary worker. This hypothesis leads to the expectation of a negative sign of 
ATE. On the contrary, the hypothesis of higher wager as investment protection expects a positive sign 
of ATE. In the analysis of wage growth, the threshold parameter is of main interest. If we interpret the 
latent  variable     
   as  unobservable  productivity  growth,  then      is  the  difference  between 
unobservable productivity growth and observed wage growth. It measures how much wage growth is 
suppressed relative to the underlying productivity growth. In other words, it measures the degree by 
which  an  employer  reaps  the  benefits  of  a  worker’s  productivity  growth.  A  potential  source  of 
productivity growth is training upon employment. Given shorter period of employment, a wage for a 
temporary worker is to be more suppressed than for a permanent worker so that an employer can 
recoup the costs of training. The hypothesis is that the threshold parameter is larger for a temporary 
worker than a permanent worker:        .  
 
5. The Data 
The dataset used in this research derives from a survey, Studies & Werk, by SEO Economic Research 
commissioned by Elsevier. Every year since 1996, SEO has surveyed a new cohort of graduates from 
post-secondary schools in the Netherlands about their education, employment situation, and transition 
from school to work. In the Netherlands, post-secondary education is divided into two levels: higher 
professional education (HBO) and university education (WO). HBO-education aims at preparation for 
specific professions and provides students with vocational skills. WO-education is more academically 
oriented,  and  is  somewhat  more  intellectual  than  HBO-education.  Approximately  45,000  students 
graduate from HBO schools and 25,000 students from WO schools in 2009.
5 Among the cohort of 2009 
in the dataset, around 4,300 respondents obtained de grees from HBO, and 3,700 obtained from  WO 
although the coverage rate differs more or less by year. This paper uses the cohorts of the survey year 
from 2005 to 2009. However, in the estimation, the year in which each observation starts his or her 
current job is more important than the survey year to control the year effect on the starting wage and 
wage growth. Those who started their current job  earlier than 2003 or in 2009 are excluded from the 
sample since there are not enough observations from these years. Moreover, those who had started their 
current jobs before graduation are omitted. On average, respondents answer the survey questionnaire 
after twenty months from graduation. The observations in the data have little, if any, experience in 
labor  markets.  Therefore,  they  are  basically  those  who  need  to  be  trained  at  the  beginning  of 
employment. As a matter of fact,  the dataset shows that the training incidence is more than 99%, 
regardless of their type of employment contract.
6 For the empirical purpose, I drop observations who 
did not receive training. As for a type of contract, temporary contracts include those who are employed 
through temporary work agencies. Self-employed workers are excluded from the sample. The starting 
hourly wage is calculated from a gross monthly wage and contracted hours of work at the time when 
starting a current job. Similarly, a current hourly wage is calculated from a gross monthly wage and 
                                                            
5 The figures are according to Statistics Netherlands (the central bureau of statistics), http://www.cbs.nl/en.  
6 The survey asks a question: “Was additional training within the company necessary for your position in your current job?” 
It should be noted that this is the measure of training incidence. The amount of training received by each worker may differ 
by the type of contract.  9 
 
contracted hours of work at the time of the survey. Then, the wage growth rate is measured as the 
difference between the log of the current hourly wage and the log of the starting hourly wage.  
 
Table 2: The Summary Statistics 
  Full Sample  Permanent  Temporary 
Share of Type of Contract  42.75  57.25 
      Starting Wage  12.9167  12.9397  12.8932 
 
(2.5565)  (2.5201)  (2.5933) 
Wage Growth  0.0992  0.1266  0.0710 
 
(0.1255)  (0.1243)  (0.1204) 
Share that wage growth is 
positive  71.48  84.17  58.45 
zero  21.38  10.27  32.78 
negative  7.14  5.56  8.77 
        Job Length in months  12.50  15.03  10.60 
 
(6.52)  (5.77)  (6.40) 
Age at starting a current job  24.68  24.37  24.91 
 
(2.24)  (2.22)  (2.22) 
Grade  7.23  7.19  7.26 
 
(0.55)  (0.53)  (0.56) 
Gender 
Male  43.09  46.81  40.31 
Female  56.91  53.19  59.69 
Diploma 
HBO  45.78  50.71  42.11 
WO  54.22  49.29  57.89 
Firm Size (the number of employees) 
less than 100  37.31  37.21  37.38 
100 to 499  22.83  22.60  23.01 
500 or more  39.86  40.19  39.61 
        Native  94.57  94.81  94.40 
Handicap  9.95  8.96  10.69 
Child  3.11  3.46  2.86 
Home  15.01  15.66  14.52 
       
Number of Observations  21,529  9,203  12,326 
[10,863]  [5,503]  [5,360] 
Note:    The  figures  in  the round parentheses are  standard deviations.  The numbers in the  square parentheses  are the 
number  of  observations  whose  wage  information  is  available.  For  the  qualitative  variables,  the  figures  are 




Figure 1: The Distribution of Staring Wage 
 
 
Since the data are retrospective and self-reported, it may suffer from measurement errors to some 
extent. Besides, the respondent rate is only about 50%.
7 As its nature of self-reported survey, the data 
are associated with some noise. To eliminate outliers, I discard the observations whose starting wage or 
wage growth is greater than 99 percentile or less than 1 percentile of the samples.  
The survey asks the year and month that a respondent started working for his or her current job. Since 
the year and month to which he or she responds the survey are also available, it is possible to measure 
the length of the current job in months. Since a maximum duration of a temporary contract employment 
is three years, I exclude respondents whose job length is more than thirty six months. The job length on 
a current job is about 12.5 months, on average.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of basic variables after dropping the observations missing one 
or more variables used in the estimation. In the sample, the share of temporary contract workers is 
larger than that of permanent workers.  
Starting wages for both types of contract are similar.  Indeed, the (unconditional) means of starting 
wages between permanent and temporary workers are not statistically significant different. Figure 1 
shows the distribution of log of starting wages by type of contract. Although  the distribution of 
temporary workers’ starting wage has fatter left tail, it shows the pattern similar to the distribution of 
permanent workers’ starting wage.  
On  the  other  hand,  the  wage  growth  patterns  are  remarkably  different  between  temporary  and 
permanent workers. The average wage growth for permanent workers is almost twice as large as that 
for temporary workers. It is partly because the shares of zero wage growth are much different. Whereas 
about 10% of permanent workers have not experienced wage growth, more than 30% of temporary 
                                                            
























2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
Log of Starting Wage
Temporary Permanent11 
 
workers are paid the same hourly wages as their starting wages at the time of the survey. This point is 
reflected in Figure 2 that shows the distributions of wage growth by type of contract. Furthermore,  
 
Figure 2: The Distribution of Wage Growth 
 
 
there  is  a  small  but  not  trivial  portion  of  workers  whose  wages  declined  since  the  beginning  of 
employment. The share of these workers is a little higher among temporary workers than permanent 
workers.   
The difference in the wage growth patterns may be due to the difference in job length. The mean of job 
length of permanent workers is around 15 months while that of temporary workers is about 11 months. 
The fact that more temporary workers face zero wage growth may be because temporary workers have 
been employed at their current job shorter than permanent workers, on average. In the estimation, it is 
important to control for job length.  
As for other descriptive variables, there seem similarities between the two types of workers in ages, 
grades at tertiary school, which are equivalent to GDP and scaled from 0 to 10, and sizes of employers. 
On the other hand, there seem differences in gender and diploma of workers. Male workers are more 
likely to have a permanent contract compared with female workers, and workers with HBO diploma are 
more likely to have a permanent contract.  
Using these date, the empirical model outlined in the previous section is estimated. The next section 
presents and discusses the results of the estimation. 
 
6. The Results 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated results. First of all, all the correlations between the error in the selection 
equation and the error in each outcome equation are statistically significant. This result indicates that 
the selection issue is important. Both of exclusion restriction variables have statistically significant 
effect on the choice of type of contract and as expected. Having a child or children makes a worker find 
a secured job, so that it has a positive sign. Living at home with parents is an opposite case. Parental 
support may cover less secured temporary position. Male workers are more likely to hold a permanent 

























Table 3: The Estimated Results 
  Selection Equation 
Starting Wage Equation  Wage Growth Equation 
Independent Variables  Permanent  Temporary  Permanent  Temporary 
Has a child/children   0.2167 
       
 
(0.0481)*** 
        Live with parents  -0.0959 
       
 
(0.0231)*** 
        Job Length 
   
0.0046  0.0072 
       




0.0113  0.0101 
       
(0.0040)***  (0.0058)* 
Male  0.1269  0.0485  0.0269  0.0144  -0.0032 
 
(0.0197)***  (0.0049)***  (0.0051)***  (0.0038)***  (0.0047) 
Diploma (reference category: HBO) 
WO  -0.1255  0.1277  0.1241  -0.0054  0.0058 
 
(0.0209)***  (0.0052)***  (0.0054)***  (0.0041)  (0.0050) 
Firm Size (reference category: 1~99) 
100 ~ 499  0.0155  0.0111  0.0341  -0.0026  -0.0098 
 
(0.0239)  (0.0060)*  (0.0062)***  (0.0047)  (0.0056)* 
500 ~    0.0103  0.0418  0.0388  -0.0096  -0.0114 
 
(0.0213)  (0.0053)***  (0.0058)***  (0.0041)**  (0.0052)** 
Constant  2.2623  2.0567  1.8023  0.0997  0.0813 
 
(0.1818)***  (0.0502)***  (0.0687)***  (0.0412)**  (0.0729) 
The Parameters 
          The standard deviation of error:    0.1763  0.1569  0.1291  0.1573 
   
(0.0034)***  (0.0022)***  (0.0019)***  (0.0028)*** 
The correlation between selection:    0.6751  -0.5279  0.3691  -0.3644 
   
(0.0237)***  (0.0243)***  (0.0385)***  (0.0687)*** 
The correlation between starting wage and wage growth 
-0.0589  -0.1354 
    (0.0090)***  (0.0246)*** 
    The threshold parameter:    
   
0.0860  0.1926 
       
(0.0036)***  (0.0050)*** 
Log Likelihood  -5,596.77 
Number of Observations  21,529 
        Note:   Standard errors are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 
10% level, respectively. The estimation is conducted by maximum likelihood estimation routine in STATA. The 
standard errors are calculated numerically. The full report of the estimation results is available upon request. In 
addition to the independent variables listed here, each equation includes the age at the start of job, the grade at 
tertiary school, the dummy for the native, the dummy for the handicapped, the regional dummies, the dummies for 
job sectors, and the year dummies.     13 
 
Female who choose whether to engage in home production or market production may want to retain 
career flexibility by holding a temporary post. Having an HBO diploma is more likely to lead to a 
permanent job position. Because of the goal of HBO education that provides specific vocational skills, 
a graduate from HBO school follows a specific career path. On the other hand, a graduate from WO 
school tries to keep flexibility at an early career rather than having decided a specific job.  
 
6.1 The Wage Growth  
Before discussing the difference in starting wages, I will discuss the wage growth first. In the wage 
growth equation, job length and its square term are included as explanatory variables. The estimated 
coefficients show that  as  the latent productivity growth is faster as job length increases, and it is 
increasingly faster as job length increases as the positive values of the coefficient indicate.
8 The effect 
of job length is larger for a temporary worker than a permanent worker.  Statistically, the Wald test 
rejects the null hypothesis that these coefficients are the same across the two equations, at any 
conventional level of significance. A faster productivity for a temporary worker may be explained as 
more effort by the worker in order to renew a contract or convert into a permanent contract.
9      
The estimates of main interest are the threshold parameters in the wage growth.  As expected by the 
hypothesis, the value of the threshold parameter is greater for a temporary worker tha n a permanent 
worker:    is more than twice as large as   . The difference is found to be statistically significant by 
the Wald test. The wage of a temporary worker is less likely to increase, and even when it grows, it is 
more compressed than the wage of a permanent worker. This finding is in favor of the hypothesis 
developed as above. An employer recoups the costs of initial training by suppressing the wage growth.  
Having  a  higher  diploma,  namely  WO,  does  not  affect  the  wage  growth  at  both  temporary  and 
permanent contracts. A male worker would face faster wage growth than a female worker if he or she 
has a permanent contract. On the other hand, there is no such gender difference if a worker is employed 
on  a  temporary  contract.  An  employer  may  train  a  male  worker  more  and  let  him  acquire  more 
experience than a female worker, which leads to faster growth for a male worker, because a female 
may  leave  a  job  for  home  production  with  a  higher  probability.  As  for  a  temporary  contract,  an 
employer does not treat a worker differently by gender because both workers will leave a job in rather 
specific future.    
With regard to gender difference, I conduct the same estimation by separating the sample between 
males and females as a part of robustness checks. As Booth et al. (2002) point out and the other 
literature documents, there are the difference in labor market outcomes by gender. The likelihood ratio 
test indicates that all the coefficients estimated in the model are statistically different jointly. However, 
the  results show  the  similar  finding  from  the  estimation pooling  males  and  females  together.  The 
threshold parameters for a male worker,    and   , are 0.2080 and 0.0987, respectively. For a female 
worker, these parameters are 0.1820 and 0.0792. As in the case of the pooled estimation, the ratio of 
the parameters is more than 2 for both males and females.  
Furthermore, the analysis so far uses the wage measured per hour. Employers can change hourly wage 
of employees not only by changing a monthly wage, but also by changing the number of contracted 
hours of work. Employer may increase the hour of work instead of cutting the wage for those who are 
found to be less productive. Because of this possible adjustment of working hours, a change in hourly 
wage is supposed to reflect an underlying  
                                                            
8 Note that even though the coefficients on the squared terms are statistically significant, the actual effect is essentially small 
since the square term is divided by 100.  
9 The evidence that temporary worker put more effort at work is documented by, for example, Engellandt and Riphahn 
(2005).  14 
 
Table 4: Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of a Permanent Contract on Starting Wage 
Overall  Year of Starting a Current Job 
2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
-0.0269  -0.0657  -0.0343  -0.0027  -0.0219  0.0048  -0.0850 
(0.0107)**  (0.0533)  (0.0116)***  (0.0102)  (0.0105)**  (0.0103)  (0.0155)*** 
Note:   Standard errors are in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 
10% level, respectively. ATE’s are evaluated at the means of the overall sample, and the means of the observations 
in each year. The standard errors are calculated by the delta method evaluated at the corresponding means.    
 
productivity change better than a change in monthly wage. As a robustness check, I also estimate the 
model using monthly wages and monthly wage growth. The main finding of the difference in the 
threshold parameters is robust to this change. The threshold parameters for a temporary worker    and 
for a permanent worker    are 0.2369 and 0.1238, respectively. Compared with the values from the 
estimation with hourly wages, the values are now little larger. It may be because that an employer 
adjusts labor costs flexibly by hours of work.  
The overall findings for the wage growth are as the hypothesis expects. The wage growth patterns are 
different  between  temporary  and  permanent  workers.  The  wage  growth  is  more  suppressed  for  a 
temporary worker.  
 
6.2 The Starting Wage  
In the starting wage equations, a male worker receives a higher starting wage than a female worker, 
regardless of which type of contract. The size of the effect is higher if a worker is employed on a 
permanent contract. Unlike the wage growth equations, a higher diploma results in a higher starting 
wage at both temporary and permanent jobs, and its magnitude is about the same between the two types 
of contract. Furthermore, larger firms tend to pay higher starting wages for their workers.  
The  interest  of  this  paper  is  not  the  differences  in  each  coefficient  between  both  of  the  starting 
equations, but in the total difference that arises from those differences. As shown above, it measures 
the average treatment effect (ATE): the effect of having a permanent contract.  Table 4 shows the 
ATE’s. The ATE’s are evaluated at not only the mean of the whole observations, but also the means of 
the sample in each year from 2003 to 2008, in order to reveal how the effects vary over the years. 
Search  activities  are  presumably  related  to  the  business  conditions.  Therefore,  there  may  be  the 
fluctuations of the ATE’s over the years.  
First of all, the ATE calculated from the overall sample is negative. It is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level.  The negative sign is in favor of the hypothesis that higher search 
costs for a permanent worker are passed on to. However, the effect is small. The starting wage for a 
temporary worker is higher than that for a permanent worker by only slightly less than 3%. Moreover, 
the effects are not stable over the years.  The effects in 2003, 2005, and 2007 are not statistically 
significant, and it takes a positive value in 2007 though it is insignificant.  
If  the  estimation  is  conducted  with  monthly  wage,  the  ATE  from  the  overall  sample  turns  to  be 
statistically  insignificant.  When the  estimation  is  separated  by gender,  the ATE  is not  statistically 
significant for males, while it is statistically significant for females. The effect for a female worker is -
0.0558. As in the case of the pooled estimation, the ATE’s are varying over the year though the effects 
in some effects are statistically insignificant. 
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The findings on the starting wage is basically in favor of the hypothesis that the starting wage paid to a 
permanent  worker  is  lowered  to  compensate  higher  search  costs  to  find  a  qualified  worker.  Even 
though  it  is  not  examined  in  this  paper,  educational  backgrounds  of  new  graduates  may  affect 
employer’s search activities. For example, if an employer is looking for a computer engineer, search for 
candidates is limited to those who study computer science or other relevant majors at school. It clearly 
reduces search costs compared with searching and seeing all new graduates as candidates.        
 
7. The Concluding Remarks 
In  this  paper,  I  examine  the  differences  in  the  wage  structures  between  temporary  workers  and 
permanent workers. The empirical finding from the dataset from the Netherlands is that a permanent 
worker receives a lower wage at the starting point of employment, but the wage growth during the 
employment is faster for a permanent worker. A temporary worker’s wage growth is more suppressed 
despite the starting wage is slightly higher. 
The difference in wage growth pattern may be explained as follows. Since the employment period of a 
temporary worker is shorter, an employer tries to recoup the cost of initial training investment by 
suppressing the wage growth relative to the underlying productivity growth. For a permanent worker, 
an employer spreads the costs over a longer employment periods so that the wage growth suppression 
is  smaller.  This  finding  is  robust  to  the  estimation  of  monthly  wage  growth,  and  the  estimations 
separating the sample by gender.  
The hypothesis that results in a higher starting wage for a temporary worker is related to the intensity of 
search activities by an employer. Since it is costly to fire a mismatched worker if employed on a 
permanent contract, an employer becomes more cautious and searches for a worker more intensively 
when hiring a worker on a permanent basis. This results in higher search costs. A lower starting wage 
for a permanent worker may be because higher search costs are passed on to the worker. However, the 
finding is not as robust as the finding on wage growth. The mechanism in the setting starting wage 
seems more complicated than hypothesized in this paper. As an improvement in this research, it is 
necessary  to  develop  a  more  rigorous  theoretical  model  on  the  starting  wage  difference  between 
temporary and permanent workers.  
In addition to the theoretical development, the research can be improved empirically. In the maximum 
likelihood  estimation,  the  simple  distributional  assumption  is  made.  The  recent  development  of 
econometric techniques can relax such assumption. Since the empirical strategy in this paper relies on 
the distribution assumption, more flexible assumptions can lead to the different results.   
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